Over the last three decades, the Africa Union has continued to slip in relevance both on the regional and global stages.
Several reasons account for this downward slide, not least the patronising rotation of its chair that does not discriminate in the endorsement of many discredited heads of state.
The decision to put the chairman above the secretary general in terms of the image of the union was a bad move that weakened the capacity and profile of the AU as a regional institution. This also compromised the union as a credible peer-group mechanism in influencing institutional development within its member countries.
The AU’s lack of influence within the global arena has also resulted its diminished clout even among its own membership. For both Africa and the western world, a strong AU should be both desirable and strategic.
While not trivialising the great pain brought on the Libyan people, the crisis in north Africa provided a rare opportunity for the AU to regroup and launch itself into relevance in the global policy arena.
After all, Libya – more than any other north African Arab country – has a well documented cultural and historical link with sub-Saharan Africa. Gaddafi has also invested time and money in the AU, and would as such be more disposed to reason with his friends south of the Sahara.
There is also great discord around the nature of the ‘UN allied response’ to the crisis, even with all its noble intentions. And then there’s the Obama factor, in which we assume the US and others are lending a listening ear to the traditionally subdued majority voices without the might of arms.
It is disheartening to hear the AU’s top man Jean Ping declare in a BBC interview that the UN stopped the AU from going to Libya to explore a diplomatic roadmap to the conflict resolution. However, he made the point that the world will return to diplomacy at the end of belligerence.
It was no surprise the African Union's diplomatic initiative lasted little longer than the photo opportunity it attracted. The failure of the AU to a present anything new was another indication of its weakened mechanism that has further diminished it status.
The AU should have been clear on a plan for the departure of Gaddafi.
The revolution has gone beyond the point of a workable solution with Gaddafi in charge; the AU should have concentrated on negotiating a get-out plan that allowed Gaddafi to nominate a transitional successor. This would then provide elbow room for both sides of the conflict.
It is also naive for the west to think Gaddafi would go like Mubarak or Ben Ali: their personalities and history are very different.
I will not dwell on the inconsistencies and controversies surrounding international intervention in an internal political crisis, as evident in the scale of responses between Ivory Coast Libya, Bahrain and Yemen, for example. But it is important to recognise that there is unspoken legitimacy for international intervention in any crisis of a humanitarian dimension, whether natural or political.
It is also important to recognise the delicate parity between humanitarian welfare and ideals of national sovereignty. But the basis of external interventions should be contextual, and also consistent in character and scale.
Son Gyoh is a development practitioner based in Galway.
